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Abstract—Smart Grid applications require accurate and cor-
rect data transmission from publisher to subscribers with critical
communication latency requirements. Since the smart grid is be-
ing supported by distributed communication networks, deployed
using various wired and wireless technologies, including IP-based
networks, securing the communication infrastructure is both
critically important and challenging. In this paper, we propose a
secure and efficient data delivery scheme, based on a restricted
yet dynamic publisher-subscriber architecture, for the published
messages from a publisher to the subscribers distributed in the
smart grid network. The scheme ensures that the published
message is delivered from an authentic publisher to only those
authorized subscribers by verifying publisher’s signature and
access structure of all subscribers. Operation overheads are
reduced by performing only one encryption and decryption or
hashing per subscriber location using a proxy node as a remote
terminal unit. Our analysis shows that the scheme is resistant
against replay, man-in-the-middle, and impersonation attacks.
Performance evaluation shows that the scheme can support 600
subscribers given the communication latency requirement of 3
ms. We provide the performance of the scheme under different
scenarios, and observe that the efficiency of our scheme increases
as the ratio of the geographical locations within a substation to
the number of subscribers increases.
Index Terms—Smart grid security, publisher-subscriber model,
communication latency, measurement data.
I. INTRODUCTION
The Smart Grid (SG), a next-generation power system, has
received massive attention by the industry, government, and
academic research organizations. The smart grid provides a
two-way communication network to support advanced appli-
cations that ensure supplying electricity to the consumers in
the efficient, reliable, and cost effective manner. In recent
years, the number of cyber-attack attempts on the power
industry has increased significantly. Cyber-attacks, such as the
power grid attack in Ukraine [1], can cause blackouts, damage
power equipment and cost significant financial loses. The
smart grid communications are governed by unicast, multicast,
and broadcast messages for different purposes. For example,
in the case of substation automation applications, multicast
communications within a power substation are governed by
a publisher-subscriber communication service that supports
asynchronous many-to-many communications among different
control components, such as Intelligent Electronic Devices
(IED). The publisher in the smart grid system is a Phasor
Gateway (PG), which is connect to the network through
routers, whereas the subscribers are destinations asking for
data, which are generally the power usage vendors. Multicast
communications in the smart grid allow the publisher to
transmit a single copy of the message directed by a series
of routers over the network. The message is then replicated
and forwarded by the intermediate router to all subscribers
that have previously subscribed the service.
A publisher-subscriber system model in the smart grid is
very different from the synchronous request-response model,
client-server model, and master-slave model. In order to
provide insight into the need for a new publisher-subscriber
model, let us consider the scenario shown in Figure 1. A
synchronous request-response model is based on timely syn-
chronization of the entities and is initiated by the requester
followed by the responder. The client-server model involves
the communications between one or many clients and a
server exhibiting real-time messages in which any further
communication by the client is blocked once it makes the
request and until the server replies to it. Also, there are client-
server models that support process multi-threading in order
to overcome such blocking issues of the client. However,
the client-server model is not useful for multicasting data
within smart grid applications as it does not support many-
to-many communications simultaneously. The requirements
for the multicast communication in the smart grid are asyn-
chronous, loosely coupled, and one/many-to-many information
flow in nature. Therefore, we argue that a publisher-subscriber
model has advantages in the smart grid over the master-slave
Fig. 1: A scenario of publishing IED’s data to the subscribers.
model due to the following features: decoupled synchronous
communication, distributed, peer-to-peer, and high scalability.
It relies on the interest expressed by the subscribers to receive
messages from the publisher. However, in order to implement a
publisher-subscriber model in the smart grid, specific issues of
platform compatibility and delay between Local Area Network
(LAN) and Wide Area Network (WAN) must be taken into
consideration [2].
The secure delivery of these multicast messages is critical
for the smart grid substations. In many cases, messages from
IEDs to IEDs and/or IEDs to the Human Machine Interface
(HMI) application are delivered with inaccurate measurement
data due to malicious activities carried out by adversary over
the weakly secure or open network. If an adversary gets access
to the network, he or she could compromise these messages
or can target the publisher in order to affect its operations
and services. Because different multicast messages at the
substation have different real-time transmission requirements,
as shown in Table I, communication latency requirements
for specific types of messages that do not support traditional
encryption become even more critical. For example, according
to IEC 61850-5, type 1A, 4, and 7B messages have a stringent
latency requirement of delivery within 3 milliseconds (ms)
[3], [4]. The security solution must be flexible enough to
accommodate such critical requirements. Therefore, a secure
and efficient scheme that could support publisher-subscriber
model in the smart grid system is needed.
A. Our Contribution
In this paper, we propose a novel secure and efficient
scheme for restricted publisher-subscriber architecture in the
smart grid based on access structure of the subscribers for
the secure delivery of published messages. The idea is to
perform minimal decryption operations at each geographic
destination by allowing a primary power component, such as
Remote Terminal Unit (RTU), to generate an aggregated key
from all subscribers for decrypting the received messages. Our
contributions are as follow:
1) The proposed architecture not only allows the secure
and efficient multicasting of messages, but also performs
specific delivery operations at reduced overhead using
Virtual-LAN (VLAN).
2) The proposed scheme is lightweight and provides a
secure delivery of data from the publisher to all its sub-
scribers using only one encryption and one decryption
per location, thus significantly reducing the overhead
incurred by each subscriber. The scheme can support up
to 600 subscribers to receive published messages from
a publisher when the communication latency require-
ment is 3 ms. Except for the time synchronization, our
scheme is flexible enough to support a large number of
subscribers for other delay requirements.
3) The scheme is also applicable and efficient in the sce-
nario where publisher and subscribers use different data
formats, and there is a converter just before each pub-
lisher to convert data format. In such case, a converter
can be attached to the proxy node that will later forward
the message to all its authorized subscribers. This will
reduce the usage and overhead involved in conversion.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2
presents related work in the context of multicast messages
delivering in publisher-subscriber smart grid system. Section 3
presents the communication system and an adversary models.
Section 4 proposes and presents a new restricted publisher-
subscriber architecture and a scheme that ensure the secure
and efficient delivery of published messages. Section 5 and
6 present security analysis and performance evaluation of the
scheme, respectively. Finally, Section 7 concludes the work.
II. RELATED WORK
In this section, we present and discuss the related work on
the multicasting messages in the publisher-subscriber commu-
nication system. Security in the smart grid system is different
from other traditional communication systems due to the fact
that the performance and reliability requirements of the power
system operations are much more critical.
In this direction, [3] and [4] discussed and performed
conformance test on IEC 61850 standard. However, they do
not discuss any security solution for the multicast messages
to be delivered over the insecure network. Ozansoy et al. in
[7] proposed a publisher-subscriber communication model for
satisfying the communications need of the IEC 61850 proto-
col. Falk [8] proposed securing the multicast authentication
mechanisms of Generic Object Oriented Substation Events
(GOOSE) and Sampled Measured Values (SMV) messages,
but without any implementation or practical details. Hong et
al. [9] performed an analysis of AES encryption, and SEED,
MD5, and HMAC integrity. However, since every connected
device has to perform encryption and message integrity, their
experiment generates a large overhead and delay. Fateri et al.
[10] presented a publisher-subscriber model with simulation-
based traffic analysis. However, the critical latency and se-
curity concerns in the smart grid network are not discussed.
Kumar et al. [11] analyzed suitable network architectures that
can meet all the requirements of North American Syncro-
Phasor Initiative Network (NASPInet). The schemes [10] and
[11] did not clearly describe the functions used by these
schemes. Recently, Heimgaertner et al. [12] proposed a cyber-
secure publish/subscribe middle-ware for control plane and
data plane communications in the smart grid. However, they
do not consider critical latency requirements of the smart grid
communication messages and do not fit well in real scenarios.
III. COMMUNICATION SYSTEM AND ADVERSARY MODELS
In this section, we discuss the publisher-subscriber commu-
nication model and the adversary model.
A. Communication Model
IEC 61850 standards are defined with Abstract Communi-
cation Service Interface (ACSI) to provide flexibility to bound
them with any middleware technology. A general publisher-
subscriber model is shown in Figure 2 where different multi-
cast messages, such as GOOSE and SMV are used to transmit
TABLE I: Transmission Time Requirements for Different IEC 61850 Messages
Message Type Application Time (ms)
P1 Class P2/P3 Class
1A Fast message (off command) 10 3
1B Fast message (other) 100 20
2 Medium speed message 100 100
3 Low speed message 500 500
4 Raw data message 10 3
5 File transfer message 1000 1000
6A Time synchronize (control & retection) 1 0.1
6A Time synchronize (measurement) 0.025 0.004
7A Command message (access control) 500 500
7B Command message (access control special task) 10 3
Fig. 2: Publisher-subscriber communication model.
periodic measurement data over the network. A communi-
cation scenario among different devices and applications are
presented in Figure 3. It presents three types of communication
in different directions using Manufacturing Message Specifi-
cation (MMS), GOOSE, and SMV.
The MMS is an ISO 9506 standard that is used to transfer
real-time process data and control information between the
network devices, such as IED, and the HMI application
running on a PC. The MMS is governed by IEC 61850-8-
1, and follows a client-server model for the (vertical) com-
munication between the SCADA and the IEDs. On the other
hand, GOOSE, an event driven message, follows publisher-
subscriber model for the asynchronous multicast communi-
cation (horizontal) between the Control & Protection (C&P)-
Fig. 3: Types of communication in the IEC 61850.
IED to C&P-IED, and is also governed by IEC 61850-8-1.
The SMV also follows a publisher-subscriber model, and is
governed by IEC 61850-9-2. It is used for the asynchronous
multicast communication with voltage and current values
between the Merging Unit (MU)-IED to C&P-IED. These
multicast messages use MAC addresses for the communica-
tion via bridge routing (brouting), and do not use IP-based
routing. GOOSE/SMV messages supports the availability of
information and high reliability by repeating transmissions
for a number of times with sequence number increment until
its Time-to-Live (TTL) expires and does not require to be
acknowledged.
The SMV (type 4) and GOOSE messages (type 1A) are time
critical messages. The medium speed message (type 2), low
speed message (type 3), file transfer functions (type 5), and
command message with access control (type 7) are mapped
to MMS protocol suits that follows TCP/IP stack. The time
synchronization messages based on Simple Network Time
Protocol (SNTP) (type 6) are broadcasted to all IEDs within
a substation using UDP [4]. Even though, GOOSE messages
are currently transmitted over LANs owned by the utilities,
and there are some initiatives to use GOOSE messages over
the WAN [5]. Since GOOSE messages are not protected, an
adversary can generate forged GOOSE messages and transmit
false status messages to listening devices. If the GOOSE
messages are not authenticated, adversary can send a bogus
message to open a breaker and disrupt the power supply [6].
B. Adversary Model
The publisher-subscriber architecture of the Substation Au-
tomation Systems (SAS) is vulnerable against Man-in-the-
Middle (MITM), replay, and impersonation attacks. The sys-
tem also suffers from the issues of the publisher (sender) au-
thentication, subscribers (receivers) authorization, and data in-
tegrity. Security attacks on critical infrastructure, such as smart
grid, are critical and the system has high importance to defeat
them. We assume that an adversary is capable of performing
security attacks over an insecure network. An adversary can
make a malicious connection between the publisher and the
subscriber to perform MITM attack. An adversary can try
to impersonate the publisher and/or the subscriber or resend
previously sent data over the network. The adversary can also
make an attempt to maliciously authenticate itself and try to
access unauthorized measurement data. In the worst case, the
adversary can try to modify the measurement data sent over the
network. The model assumes that middleware implementing
the publiser-subscriber system is honest but curious.
IV. PROPOSED RESTRICTED PUBLISHER-SUBSCRIBER
ARCHITECTURE AND SCHEME
In this section, we propose and describe a new restricted
publisher-subscriber architecture along with our scheme.
A. Proposed Architecture Design
In a generic publisher-subscriber model, the publishers need
not to know the recipients of their data and subscribers do
not know the publishers and their locations. However, in
the smart grid scenario, it is important to authenticate each
publisher and the subscriber, and allow only the legitimate
subscribers with appropriate rights to access the data published
by the publishers, especially during critical power operations.
In order to address this challenge in the smart grid, we
propose and present a new restricted yet dynamic publisher-
subscriber architecture for the smart grid substation, as shown
in Figure 4, where each publisher has an access of the list of
its subscribers. This list could be anonymous, but the publisher
should be able to access the public keys of all the subscribers.
Figure 4(a) presents the basic architecture of the publisher-
subscriber model. A dynamic list of publishers and subscribers
is maintained, so they can change at any time, and join and
leave the network as per their requirements. There are brokers
(the ones dispatch messages) and filters to which subscribers
registers in our system architecture. For simplicity, we did
not mention them in Figure 4. There are generic filters that
publisher can publish and to which subscribers can subscribe.
Here, addresses and locations can be implemented as filters
for the publishers and subcribers depending upon the topics
or the contents. Generally, subscribers at the substation are
connected through a LAN and we can provide enough security
to this communication network, if it is not already there. This
assumption is realistic and currently implemented at many
power substations as per our understanding.
Here, publisher P publishes the messages whenever
it has data to be sent to all its n-subscribers Si =
{S1, S2, ..., Sk, Sk+1, ..., Sn} who had previously subscribed
to the service. As shown in Figure 4(b), we modify the
traditional architecture to propose a new architecture where
a publisher P publishes the messages to its subscribers
Sij = {S11, S12, ..., S21, S22, ..., Smn} mentioned in the list
for a specific topic or content depending upon the filter
settings. Here, m are different geographical locations within
the substation. Also, each geographic location has a special
node, called proxy node PX, such as a Remote Terminal Unit
(RTU), which receives the messages from the publisher on
behalf of all the connected subscribers j (j = 1, 2, ..., n) in
that particular location i (i = 1, 2, ...,m). In order to reduce
the overhead of having an additional node at each location,
one of the subscribers at each location can act as a proxy
node, as shown in Figure 4(c). The selection of a proxy node
can be done randomly or based on specific features, such
as nearest location to the publisher, having more computing
power, implementation specific, number of neighbor nodes and
so on. The proxy node can also be changed depending upon
the filters and brokers applied by the publisher. For special
purposes, the subscribers at the substation can be configured
with VLANs as shown in Figure 4(d). This will reduce the
delay and improve the performance when there are only few
subscribers at nearby locations. The assumption of proxy node
PX is trusted for connected subscribers is fair, but the publisher
does not trust proxy node or any other subscriber.
B. Proposed Scheme
We propose a new secure and efficient published mes-
sage delivery scheme in a substation, based on the proposed
architecture discussed in the previous section (Figure 4(c))
that also maintains confidentiality and/or message integrity.
In the publisher-subscriber model of the smart grid, when
the publisher multicasts a message to its subscribers, the
subscribers need to verify whether the messages are correctly
and accurately received from the publisher. In order to do so,
the publisher in our scheme first retrieves an access structure of
the targeted subscribers. Note that one location may have more
than one access structure for the subscribers based on different
services subscribed. The scheme considers that each publisher
will multicast a message to each proxy node at different
locations, and each proxy node will take appropriate actions,
such as decryption or check message integrity, based on the
type of message received. The proxy node will forward the
original message to its authorized and connected subscribers.
The publisher encrypts or hashes the transmitted message,
and multicasts it to all the respective proxy nodes located
at different locations so that only the authorized subsets of
the proxy nodes at the substation can recover the message.
Each proxy node first decrypts the message or verifies hash
of the message. The proxy node forwards the message to
its connected and authorized subscribers only if the message
received from the publisher is valid. We present our scheme
in two phases: scheme initialization and scheme execution.
(1) Scheme Initialization: We denote an authorized subset
of the receiving subscribers at a proxy node as Fi, where i =
1, 2, ...,m are the proxy nodes, each at different location. The
overall access structure is defined as F = {F1+F2+...+Fm}
where F1 = {S11, S12, ..., S1n}, F2 = {S21, S22, ..., S2n},
..., Fm = {Sm1, Sm2, ..., Smn}. Let E be the elliptic curve
defined over a finite field Fp, and let G be a publicly known
base point and generator with order p on E. We assume
that each subscriber Sij at the substation has a private key
xij ∈ [1, p− 1] and a corresponding public key yij = xij .G,
where i = 1, 2, 3, ...,m and j = 1, 2, 3, ..., n. Only the
authorized subscribers will receive the message by the PX.
First, the proxy node generates partial private and public
keys for the subscriber nodes connected to it and sends these
keys to the respective subscribers in a secure manner. Upon
receiving the keys, each subscriber node generates its actual
private and public keys, and sends its public key to the proxy
(a) From a publisher to its subscribers. (b) From a publisher to proxy nodes geographically connected to other
subscribers.
(c) From a publisher to subscribers acting as proxy nodes that are
connected to other subscribers.
(d) From a publisher to subscribers acting as proxy nodes that are
connected to other subscribers via VLANs.
Fig. 4: Different multicasting scenarios of publisher-subscriber communication architecture.
node. Consequently, all public keys are stored in an off-
line repository accessible to the publisher. In particular, we
consider a publisher P and a specific proxy PX at a location
with subscribers Sj . The PX generates a random value rPX ,
and passes a sum of rPX and its private key as a token to the
first subscriber connected to it. Each subscriber also generates
a random value rSj . Then, when the first subscriber receives
a token, it adds its private key xSj along with the generated
random rSj , and then forwards it to the next subscriber. This
process continues until the last subscriber repeats the same
and passes the token computed as Tok = rPX +
∑n
j=1 xSj +∑n
j=1 rSj , back to the proxy node. Upon receiving the token
from the last node, the proxy node computes Actual Token
Value (ATV) by computing ATV = Tok − rPX , and stores
it in its memory. Also, all the involved nodes send their
random values rSj directly to the proxy node, which keeps
their sum as rsum =
∑n
j=1 rSj . Whenever the proxy node
receives data from the publisher, it first computes True Token
Value (TTV) as TTV = ATV − rsum =
∑n
j=1 xSj , and then
uses this value to extract the actual data from messages on
behalf of all its connected subscribers. The random numbers
keep the actual secret keys protected from other subscribers,
proxy node, or adversary. This process of generating keys and
random numbers is repeated every few minutes to compute
new values of Tok and TTV. This helps the system to quickly
recover, even if the current state of the system is compromised.
Finally, the proxy node transmits the message (in plaintext)
to each of the authorized and connected subscribers over a
secure network. The data can be encrypted by the publisher
using the public key of each proxy node and decrypted by
the proxy node using its private key. It ensures the sender
authenticity. Asymmetric encryption is much slower than
symmetric encryption. Therefore, we consider a symmetric
algorithm for the encryption with a secret key shared between
the publisher and each PX.
We also design a lightweight and secure cipher function for
data encryption and decryption, which converts each plaintext
PT into ciphertext CT and vice versa, as follows:
At the publisher: CT = fenc(PT, counter, sk);
At the proxy node: PT = fdec(CT, counter, sk);
where sk is a symmetric secret key generated by the
publisher, each time it publishes data using a pseudo-random
number generator. The counter is a number generated by
a pre-shared function between the publisher and the proxy
node. The counter changes every few minutes at both ends.
The definitions of fenc and fdec for encrypting and decrypting
each plaintext PT and ciphertext CT messages are as follows:
Encryption
fenc(PT, counter, sk) {
CT = (PT +counter)⊕sk;
counter ++;
return CT ; }
| Decryption
| fdec(CT, counter, sk) {
| PT = (CT⊕sk)−counter;
| counter ++;
| return PT ; }
A shared key k is generated using Elliptic Curve Diffie Hell-
man (ECDH) algorithm and is shared between the publisher
(k = xp.yS1 ) and the current proxy node (k = xS1 .yp) among
subscribers at each location, where (xp, yp) is the private-
public key pair of the publisher. The purpose of generating
the k key is to support symmetric encryption between the
publisher and each proxy node for transmitting the sk key,
because asymmetric encryption is almost 1000 times slower
than symmetric encryption [13]. This k key is different for
each publisher-proxy node pair in the substation. We believe
that there are least chances of “ciphertext malleable” due to
performing XOR and addition operations, as the sk key is
generated for each new encryption and counter changes each
time it is used. In the worset case if a ciphertext is compromed,
there are no chances that the adversary could extract the
original messages from the other ciphertexts as well.
(2) Scheme Execution: This phase involves the compu-
tations performed by the publisher and each proxy node on
behalf of its authorized subscribers.
At Publisher: Each publisher does the following:
• Step 1. Chooses a random number rP ∈ [1, p − 1] and
computes a point B = rP .G.
• Step 2. Extracts the public keys yij of the subscribers
authorized for receiving the message and computes Ti
for each different geographical location grouped by its
subscribers, where Ti = {T1, T2, ..., Tm}, and T1 =
{y11.rP+...+y1n.rP }, ..., Tm = {ym1.rP+...+ymn.rP }.
• Step 3. Sends encrypted message M as C1 = Ek(M) for
each location or hash of the message H(M) and appends
it as C1 =M ||H(M) for all locations, depending on the
communication latency requirement with each type of the
message. Then computes C2 = (xP .counter.(TSi||Fi)+
IDP ).G, where xP , k, and IDP are the private key,
shared key, and identity of the publisher.
• Step 4. Converts Ti into a string [14] and computes Zij =
C1 ⊕ Ti, where Zij = {Z11, Z12, ..., Zmn}.
• Step 5. Finally, sends (Fi, B, Zij , C2, TSi, IDP ) to the
respective proxy nodes over the insecure network. Here,
Fi is an access structure {F1, F2, ..., Fm} for the respec-
tive proxy nodes and TSi is the current timestamp value.
At Proxy Node (Substation’s RTU): Each proxy node PXi
that receives the message performs the following steps:
• Step 1. Verifies the sender’s signature by computing R =
IDP .G and verifying C2
?
= R+ yP . counter.(TSi||Fi),
where yP = xP .G is the public key of the sender.
• Step 2. Retrieves the received access structure Fi and
previously computed TTV , computes T
′
i = B.TTV ,
converts T
′
i into a string, and retrieves C
′
1 = Zij ⊕ T
′
i .
• Step 3. Retrieves M
′
= Dk(C
′
1) or verifies message
integrity as H(M) ?= H(M
′
) depending on the commu-
nication latency requirement with each type of message.
• Step 4. Forwards M to all its authorized subscribers over
a secure network.
AES-GCM (Galois/Counter mode) or the proposed cipher
function can be used for encrypting and decrypting the mes-
sage, whereas SHA256 is suitable for maintaining message
integrity, depending upon the types of messages. The GCM
mode provides both confidentiality and integrity, and the
plaintext is XORed with output from the block cipher. The
adversary cannot guess the output unless it already knows
both, the plaintext and the ciphertext. Message integrity is pro-
vided for the messages that do not require confidentiality, such
as alert messages. We assume here that time synchronization
between all network nodes is maintained, if not, we can use
nonce or random numbers in place of timestamp values.
V. SECURITY ANALYSIS
This section presents the security analysis of the proposed
scheme.
A. Correctness Proof
Ww consider three subscribers as S1, S2, and S3 connected
with the PX. Subscribers S1, S2, and S3 have (x1, y1), (x2,
y2), and (x3, y3) private-public key pairs, respectively. The
proxy node has a pre-computed TTV = x1 + x2 + x3. First,
the publisher chooses a random r ∈ [1, p − 1] and computes
B = r.G. Thereafter, it computes T = y1.r+y2.r+y3.r, C1 =
Ek(M) or C1 =M ||H(M), and Z = C1 ⊕ T . The publisher
sends message (F,B,Z,C2,TSi, IDP ) to the proxy node of
the subscribers of a specific location. Here F = {S1, S2, S3}.
On receiving the message, the PX first verifies identity of the
sender. If it matches, the PX computes T
′
= B.TTV = B(x1+
x2 + x3). Thereafter, the PX extracts
C1 = Z ⊕ T ′ = (C ⊕ T )⊕ T ′
= C1 ⊕ r.(y1 + y2 + y3)⊕ r.(y1 + y2 + y3) = C1.
Finally, the PX retrieves M
′
= Dk(C1) or verifies message
integrity by comparing H(M) ?= H(M
′
).
B. Resistance Against Security Attacks
This section discusses the security of the proposed scheme,
i.e., how our scheme is able to ensure secure and authorized
data delivery and defeats attacks listed in the adversary model.
1) Secure and Authorized Data Delivery: The proposed
scheme provides a secure and authorized delivery of pub-
lished data from the authenticated publisher to all of its
subscribers. Any unauthorized or malicious user at any lo-
cation of the substation cannot (i) send (as a publisher) a
malicious message (as sender authenticity is verified) or (ii)
retrieve a message content as a subscriber (as access structure
of each subscriber is verified). On receiving the messages,
the proxy node (substation’s RTU) verifies the signature of
the publisher by computing R = IDP .G and comparing
C2
?
= R + yP .counter.(TSi||Fi), where yP = xP .G. If the
verification in successful, then the identity of the publisher and
the authenticity of the access structure is proved.
2) Prevention Against Replay Attack: The proposed scheme
is secure against replay attack as a timestamp value TSi is
used with each transmitted message. The proxy node ensures
that the timestamp is unique and correct. The proxy node can
easily verify TSi in each C2
?
= R + yP .counter.(TSi||Fi).
Also, the adversary do not have the knowledge of counter
value. If the system is not synchronized, we can use nonces
instead of timestamp values.
3) Prevention Against Man-in-the-Middle Attack: We con-
sider that there is no direct communication between the pub-
lisher and the proxy node as subscriber. Instead, all commu-
nication is routed through an adversary. The proposed scheme
is indistinguishable against Chosen Plaintext Attack (CPA) as
it can be proved by the following property:
Definition 1. Let SE = (K, E ,D) be a symmetric encryp-
tion scheme, and let A be an adversary that has access to an
oracle that takes input a pair of messages and returns a mes-
sage. Then Advind−cpaSE (A) = 2.P r[GuessASE ⇒ true]− 1.
In this game, using the oracle provided to an adversary A,
A can guess if a specific bit b (say last) is 0 or 1, where b is
chosen at random ∈ Zn. Thus, Pr[GuessASE ⇒ true] is the
probability that A correctly guesses the message bit and this
value is 1/2 when A gains no advantage. The random oracle
can compute cipher1 = EK(msg1) and cipher2 = EK(msg2)
for the given input messages msg1 and msg2, respectively.
The scheme is secure if A is not able to correctly guess the
message, which was encrypted by the oracle out of these two.
Our scheme uses a secret key for each session to encrypt
and decrypt the transmitted message. The scheme also uses a
unique counter for each operation and A has no idea about its
starting value. This all make the scheme to be indistinguishable
for any chosen message, hence, secure against CPA.
The adversary cannot perform MITM attack, as the data
values are encrypted using a cipher algorithm and can only
be decrypted by the respective PX. No secret or public
information is sent from the subscribers to the publisher using
which the adversary could establish an active but malicious
connection between the publisher and the subscribers. An ad-
versary also cannot retrieve the actual content of the message.
4) Prevention Against Impersonation Attack: In this sec-
tion, we discuss how the proposed scheme prevents imper-
sonation attack when an adversary tries to impersonate the
publisher by sending a forged C2 to the proxy.
Definition 2. Let DS = (KeyGen, Sign,Ver) be a signature
scheme with a message space M.
KeyGen() → (xP , yP ): A probabilistic key generation al-
gorithm that takes no input, and generates a set of signing
(private) and public keys of the publisher.
Sign(xP ,msg)→ C2: A probabilistic signing algorithm that
takes as input a signing key xP and a message msg ∈ M,
and outputs C2 = (xP .counter.(TSi||Fi) + IDP ).G.
Ver(yP ,msg, C2)→ {0, 1}: A deterministic verification algo-
rithm that takes as input a public key yP , a message msg, and
a signature C2, verifies C2
?
= R+ yP .counter.(TSi||Fi), and
outputs either 0 (invalid) or 1 (valid).
The adversary also cannot perform impersonation attack.
An attempt of impersonating the publisher will fail as the
adversary does not have the private key xp of the publisher.
Hence, the signature of the adversary will not be successfully
verified at the proxy node (RTU). If the adversary sends a
forged message, it will not be correctly decrypted by the PX,
and as a result, the PX will discard the message.
VI. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
In this section, we discuss different possible communication
scenarios based on the number of control devices at different
geographical locations at the substation. In our scheme, the
processes of generating keys and random numbers are fast
enough to enable quick system recovery even under attack.
We also compare the total computations and the execution
time of the proposed scheme with the existing schemes.
A. Communication Scenarios
Each proxy node has an access instance from a set
{F1, F2, ..., Fm}, each of which is having different subscribers
as {S1, S2, ..., Sn}. We discuss three different scenarios (n >
m, n = m and n < m) with n control devices at m different
geographical locations at the substation: (i) n < m: more
encryption/hash operations are executed by the publisher than
decryption operations by the proxy nodes, and this case can
be used for specific services using proposed architecture with
VLAN shown in Figure 4(d), (ii) n = m: lower overhead than
(i) as a smaller number of decryption operations are needed by
each proxy node, and (iii) n > m: less decryption operations
performed by the proxy nodes, hence the overall overhead is
reduced by using the proposed architecture in Figure 4(c).
B. Computation Overhead and Execution Time
The proposed scheme performs (n + 1)-addition, 2-XOR,
(n + 4)-multiplication, and 1 encryption and 1 decryption or
2 hash operations depending upon the operation performed
on a specific type of the message. Based on the execution
times of different operations, the total computation time of our
scheme is 0.83477+0.00285×n +0.000933×(n− 1) using the
proposed cipher function at each location. Table II summarizes
the comparison of computation overhead of our scheme with
the scheme [12]. The schemes [10] and [11] did not clearly
describe the functions used by these schemes. Therefore, we
cannot evaluate their computation overhead. By observing the
table, it can be concluded that our scheme is lightweight and
efficient as compared to the scheme in [12].
We develop an experimental setup with a co-simulator [15].
The co-simulator uses JDK1.7 with Gridsim, PowerWorld,
MATLAB, and Java Agent Development Framework (JADE)
on Intel Core i3-4005U CPU 1.7GHz with Win7 and 4GB
RAM to implement communication and power system scenar-
ios between the publisher and the proxy (subscriber) node.
We consider a 24 substations system case with 42 buses, 62
lines, 7 generators, 27 loads, 6 transformers, and 9 shunts.
Table III describes the selected ranges of the communication
parameters for our simulation, which supports data packets
with message passing using C37.118 protocol. We simulate
the system by varying the baud rate from 20-24 mbits/sec,
Maximum Transmission Unit (MTU) from 32-1024 bytes
(transport segment 1-249), and packet size 50-1500 bytes.
Generation of a random number, addition, and XOR take
0.69 ms, 0.000933 ms, and 0.029132 ms, respectively, while
the hardware implementation of elliptic curve multiplication
operation takes 0.00258 ms [16]. AES-GCM, proposed cipher
TABLE II: Computational Analysis
Parameters Our Scheme Heimgaertner et
al. [12]
Key generation operations (n+1)RAND nKDF
Key generation time with
one subscriber (ms)
1.38 4.1
Scheme Operations (n+1)ADD, 2XOR,
(n+4)MUL, 1E, 1D
4nMAC, 2nRSA,
2AES
Scheme execution time
with one subscriber (ms)
0.84 1032
TABLE III: Parameters for Simulation Setup
Parameters Range Value Unit
Baud rate 20 - 24 megabits/sec
MTU 32-1024 bytes
Packet size 50-1500 bytes
function, and RSA take (13 ms, 4 ms), (0.032 ms, 0.032
ms), and (16 ms, 15 ms) for encryption and decryption op-
erations, respectively. Hash function SHA256, MAC function
HMACSHA256, and hash (SHA256)-based Key Derivation
Function (KDF) take 4, 246, and 4.1 ms, respectively. We run
a simulation with 32 bytes MTU, 50 bytes packet size, and 24
megabits/sec as data transmission rate between the publisher
and the PX, which took 0.0166 ms time. We can consider
this communication time negligible (close to zero ms) for
our analysis. The total computation times between a publisher
and a proxy node (RTU) are 0.84, 0.87, 1.19, and 2.94 ms,
respectively, for 1, 10, 100, and 600 subscribers. Based on
these parameter setting, our scheme can support up to 600
subscribers at one location, when the latency requirement is 3
ms for message types 1A (P2/P3) and 4 (P2/P3). Note that
the total time needs to include data transmission between
publisher-PX and PX-subscriber, and computation time at
publisher and PX. For other message types, the scheme can
support delivery of data with the proposed cipher and hash
functions. A comparison of execution times with the schemes
in [10] and [11] is shown in Table IV. Our scheme is much
efficient than these both schemes.
VII. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS
We proposed a novel lightweight, secure, and efficient data
delivery scheme for the publisher-subscriber architecture in
smart grid. The scheme provides accurate and correct delivery
of published messages with data from the publisher to all its
authorized subscribers over an insecure network. The scheme
is scalable up to 600 subscribers when the latency requirement
is 3 ms, and can support a large number of subscribers to
receive measurement data simultaneously under other less
TABLE IV: Comparison of Execution Times (ms)
# of Subscribers Fateri et al.
[10]
Kumar et al. [11] Our Scheme
1 2.17 6.3 0.84
10 2.18 6.5 0.87
100 2.22 7.3 1.19
600 4.01 8.1 2.94
stringent latency requirements. The scheme reduces the over-
all overhead compared to the traditional publisher-subscriber
model and is feasible to implement for real-time applications
at substations. The presented system model considers that all
the subscribers at a location trust each other (including proxy
node) and are connected with a secure LAN. Hence, as a future
work, we will extend this work by exploring the possibilities
and their impact when the proxy node, brokers, filters and
subscribers cannot be trusted. This scheme is not suitable when
a subscriber does not provide it’s correct private key.
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